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HAVE WE TRAVELED TOO FAR?: THE RISE OF THE TRAVEL
ACT IN HEALTH CARE CORRUPT PAYMENT CASES
I.

Maria Paniscotti*

Introduction

In 2019, the Department of Justice (DOJ) expressly denounced
medical professionals and executives who solicit or receive corrupt
payments.1 In the DOJ’s view, these white-collar health care crimes are
not victimless; they are indeed just as nefarious as any other criminal
action.2 In fact, the DOJ believes these crimes cost American health care
programs billions of dollars and announced that it will not tolerate
health care providers who look to personally benefit from cheating the
United States’ people and health care programs.3 Given the gravity of
this issue, subsequent health risks to Americans, and the financial cost
to the American health care system, the United States government,
federal agencies, and state governments have pursued corrupt
payments, such as illegal kickbacks and bribes, as aggressively as they
have pursued health care fraud and abuse.4 There is little chance that
federal agencies, especially the DOJ, will cease their intense enforcement
actions in the future.5
*J.D. Candidate, 2021, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., summa cum laude,
2018, Fordham University. I would first like to thank my faculty advisor, Professor
Jacob Elberg, for his invaluable insight and assistance throughout the entire comment
writing process. I would also like to express my gratitude to my parents, sister, and
Andrew Stahl for their constant support, love, and guidance.
1 See generally Press Release, Dep’t. of Just., Federal Indictments & Law
Enforcement Actions in One of the Largest Health Care Fraud Schemes Involving
Telemedicine and Durable Medical Equipment Marketing Executives Results in
Charges Against 24 Individuals Responsible for Over $1.2 Billion in Losses (Apr. 9,
2019), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/federal-indictments-and-law-enforcementactions-one-largest-health-care-fraud-schemes.
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 Although fraud and abuse are often used interchangeably, there is a slight
distinction. Fraud denotes deception and misrepresentations in order to benefit oneself,
while abuse is when one engages in practices that are not sound, or fail to meet the
standard of care. See generally, ALICE G. GOSFIELD, MEDICARE AND MEDICAID FRAUD AND ABUSE
§ 1:2, Westlaw (database updated July 2020).
5 See Melissa Jampol & George Breen, DOJ’s Health Care Enforcement Initiative Is
Still Going Strong, LAW360 (July 19, 2018, 2:33 PM),
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Although most health care providers generally engage in ethical
behavior and provide high-quality patient-centric care, lawmakers
realize that some unscrupulous providers attempt and sometimes
succeed in exploiting government health care programs for their
personal gain.6 The federal government has an interest in deterring
illicit health care payments and activities, as it funds and runs six major
health care programs.7
In response, Congress enacted a full battery of statutes regulating
the health care system, including but not limited to: the federal AntiKickback Statute (AKS), the Health Care Fraud Statute, the False Claims
Act, Exclusion Provisions, and the Civil Monetary Penalties law.8 Despite
the number of federal health care fraud statutes, there is a noticeable
gap in regulation of health care professionals soliciting or receiving
corrupt payments for business referrals, goods, or services that are
reimbursable under private insurance.9 Ultimately, this creates an
obstacle for complete and successful regulation of health care providers.
This gap in regulation becomes increasingly apparent in instances
where health care providers have restructured their practices to
exclude patients enrolled in government-payor programs and only
accept patients with private-payor insurance.10 Government-payor
programs cover approximately one-third of Americans, so one would
think that it would be advantageous for health care providers to accept
https://www.law360.com/articles/1064720/doj-s-health-care-enforcementinitiative-is-still-going-strong.
6 CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., U.S. DEP’T. HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., LAWS AGAINST
HEALTH
CARE
FRAUD
RESOURCE
GUIDE
1
(2014),
http://www.healthsmartmso.com/downloadfile/FWA/Care1stFWA/11%20%20FWA-Law%20Against%20Health%20Care%20Fraud.pdf.
7 COMM. ON ENHANCING FED. HEALTHCARE QUALITY PROGRAMS & INST. OF MED., LEADERSHIP
BY EXAMPLE: COORDINATING GOVERNMENT ROLES IN IMPROVING HEALTH CARE QUALITY, 3 (Janet M.
Corrigan et al. eds., Nat’l Acad. Press 2003). The six major health care programs funded
by the federal government are: Medicare, Medicaid, the State Children’s Health
Insurance Program, the Department of Defense TRICARE and TRICARE for Life
programs, the Veterans Health Administration, and the Indian Health Service Program;
Id at 2.
8 See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b (2018); 18 U.S.C. § 1347 (2010); 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2009);
42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7 (1990); 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a (1998); DEP’T. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVICES, supra note 6 at 1.
9 Private health insurance providers include Humana, Cigna Health, and United
Health. See Alex Flitton, Top 25 Health Insurance Companies in the U.S., PEOPLEKEEP BLOG
(JAN. 13, 2020, 4:09 PM), https://www.peoplekeep.com/blog/top-25-health-insurancecompanies-in-the-u.s.
10 Private health insurance is purchased through companies such as United Health,
Humana, Blue Cross Blue Shield, among others. This is not an exhaustive list of private
health insurance providers. See Susan Smith, The Travel Act: Enforcing Prohibitions
Against Referrals Through State Bribery Laws, WOLTERS KLUWER: HEALTH LAW DAILY WRAP
UP (June 2, 2018) at 2.
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beneficiaries from the six major government-payor programs:
Medicare, Medicaid, the State Children’s Health Insurance Program, the
Department of Defense TRICARE and TRICARE for Life programs, the
Veterans Health Administration, and the Indian Health Services
program.11 However, health care entities that accept government-payor
program benefits experience increased legal scrutiny and are within
federal jurisdiction under statutes such as the Anti-Kickback
Statute(AKS), the False Claims Act, Stark Law, Exclusion Statute, and
Civil Monetary Penalties Law.12
When health care practitioners exclude government-payor
program beneficiaries to escape possible legal sanctions, certain health
care statutes, such as the federal Anti-Kickback Statute, are rendered
ineffective, potentially placing illicit payment structures out of
prosecutorial reach.13 The AKS prohibits and criminalizes transactions
inducing or rewarding referrals for items and services billed to federal
payor programs, and prohibits knowingly and willfully soliciting or
receiving any remuneration in return for referring an individual to a
service compensable under a federal health care program or purchasing
any item compensable under a federal health care program.14 In
addition, the AKS prohibits knowingly or willfully offering or paying any
remuneration to a person for the same purpose of inducing services or
items payable under a federal payor program.15 Since the AKS explicitly
requires the remuneration in exchange for referrals of business, goods,
and services to be one that is compensable under a federal health care
program, the federal Anti-Kickback Statute becomes ineffective where
no federal payor programs are affected.
Congress recognized this limit on its traditional conduits for health
care prosecutions, and recently enacted the Eliminating Kickbacks and
Recovery Act (EKRA) to help eliminate corrupt payment practices, as
well as to stop patient brokers who profit from the nationwide opioid
epidemic.16 EKRA prohibits the knowing and willful solicitation,
11 See Health Insurance Coverage of the Total Population, THE KAISER FAMILY
FOUNDATION, https://www.kff.org/other/state-indicator/totalpopulation/?currentTimeframe=0&sortModel=%7B%22colId%22:%22Location%22,
%22sort%22:%22asc%22%7D#; NANCY NILES, BASICS OF THE U.S. HEALTH CARE SYSTEM,
206-09 (3d ed. 2016).
12 Center for Medicare & Medicaid Services, Medicare Fraud & Abuse: Prevent, Detect,
Report (Feb. 2019), https://www.cms.gov/Outreach-and-Education/MedicareLearning-Network-MLN/MLNProducts/Downloads/Fraud-Abuse-MLN4649244.pdf.
13 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b.
14 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(1).
15 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(2).
16 64 Cong. Rec. H9244 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 2018) (statement of Rep. Frank Pallone)
(explaining that patient brokers are individuals who target those with opioid use
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receiving, paying, or offering renumeration, “directly or indirectly, . . . in
return for referring a patient or patronage to a recovery home, clinical
treatment facility, or laboratory” if those services are covered by a
health care benefit program.17
EKRA’s statutory language is
intentionally broader than AKS and is meant to address the current gap
in prosecuting corrupt payments involving private insurance.18
However, EKRA still falls short of fully covering the existing
prosecutorial gap. Specifically, EKRA is ineffective in instances where
there is no recovery home, clinical treatment facility, or laboratory.
However, this trend to create new tools to combat corrupt payments
and practices within the health care sphere existed prior to EKRA’s
enactment; the federal government targeted private-payor corrupt
health care payment schemes with a relatively unknown sixty-year old
statute, 18 U.S.C §1952 (The Travel Act).19 This Comment will delve into
the implications of the federal government utilizing the Travel Act in
this new and inventive way.

II.

Background Information

Although the federal government has begun to utilize the Travel
Act to punish individuals engaged in illicit health care transactions,
Congress originally created the Travel Act to fight against racketeering
and corruption associated with organized crime.20 In 1961, Attorney
General Robert F. Kennedy proposed 18 U.S.C §1952, “Interstate and
foreign travel or transportation in aid of racketeering and enterprises”
to punish individuals conducting interstate operations in furtherance of
unlawful acts, such as, “gambling, prostitution, violent crime, untaxed
liquor distribution, extortion, and bribery.”21 The text of §1952
prohibits:

disorders and refer them to substandard or fraudulent providers in exchange for
kickbacks).
17 18 U.S.C § 220(a)(1)-(2) (2018).
18 Nick Oberheiden, 6 Impacts on Laboratories, Clinics, and Other Treatment
Facilities, THE NAT’L L. REV. (Dec. 10, 2020), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/6impacts-ekra-laboratories-clinics-and-other-treatment-facilities.
19 18 U.S.C § 1952 (2014); Jampol, supra note 5.
20 Patrick D. Souter, The Travel Act: Sixty‐Year Old “New” Tool in Healthcare Fraud
Enforcement,
ABA
(May
1,
2018),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/health_law/publications/aba_health_esource/
2017-2018/may2018/travelact/.
21 Smith, supra note 10, at 1; 18 U.S.C § 1952.
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(a) Whoever travels in interstate or foreign commerce or uses
the mail or any facility in interstate or foreign commerce, with
the intent to—
(1) distribute the proceeds of any unlawful activity; or
(2) commit any crime of violence to further any unlawful
activity; or
(3) otherwise promote, manage, establish, carry on, or
facilitate the promotion, management, establishment, or
carrying on, of any unlawful activity. . . .
(b) As used in this section (i) “unlawful activity” means . . .
(2) extortion, bribery, or arson in violation of the laws of
the State in which committed or of the United States, or
. . . .22
With the rise in health care prosecutions under the Travel Act,
many health care attorneys caution those in the field to parse federal
statutes more carefully, and to focus on statutes beyond the traditional
healthcare-related federal statutes.23 Irrespective of these wellintentioned warnings, health care professionals and legal practitioners
have not directly questioned whether the Travel Act is a proper tool to
prosecute health care fraud and abuse in the first place.24
The federal government’s decision to prosecute health care
schemes under the Travel Act has raised several concerns, which
include: prosecutors moving beyond the Travel Act’s original intent of
prosecuting organized crime, the Act’s broad language, the
government’s lack of interest in pursuing private-payor illegal
remuneration schemes, and other potential issues. This Comment will
focus on these issues to ultimately determine whether the Travel Act’s
extension into the health care space is proper.

22

18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)–(b).
See generally, Matthew Hogan and B. Scott McBride, The Government’s Creative Use
of the Travel Act in Healthcare Fraud Prosecutions, MORGAN LEWIS (May 22, 2019),
https://www.morganlewis.com/blogs/healthlawscan/2019/05/the-governmentscreative-use-of-the-travel-act-in-healthcare-fraud-prosecutions.
24 The first noted use of the Travel Act in healthcare abuse and fraud prosecution
was in 2013. See, DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. & DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HEALTH CARE FRAUD &
ABUSE CONTROL PROGRAM: ANN. REP. FOR FISCAL YEAR 2013, 24 (Feb. 2014).
23
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Analysis
A. PRELIMINARY ISSUES
1. Moving Beyond The Travel Act’s Legislative Intent
Into the Health Care Sphere

When Congress enacted the Travel Act, it was “the most
controversial and important statute within [Attorney General Robert F.]
Kennedy’s organized crime package proposal,” and was a smaller piece
of a greater movement and legislative program directed toward
dismantling organized crime.25 Congress targeted organized crime’s
intricate interstate structure because state government resources were
inadequate to deal with the complex and interstate nature of multiparty
organized crime.26
i. The Travel Act’s Origins
In an effort to thwart interstate organized crime, Kennedy
proposed the Travel Act to enable the federal government to aid local
law enforcement authorities.27 The Act was deemed “necessary to aid
local law enforcement officials in instances where ‘the “top men” of a
given criminal operation resided in one state but conducted their illegal
activities in another.’”28 Overall, Congress’ primary motivation for
enacting § 1952 was to quell organized crime.
ii. Can Prosecutors Read the Travel Act Broadly Outside its
Organized Crime Context?
Due to the Travel Act’s broad language, it covers a number of
crimes traditionally considered outside of the organized crime

25

Souter, supra note 20 (citing Attorney General’s Program to Crush Organized Crime
and Racketeering: Hearing on Legislation Involving Organized Crime before H. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 87th Cong. (1961) (Statement of Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy));
see also Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 41 (1979) (discussing the Travel Act’s
legislative history).
26 Perrin, 444 U.S. at 41 (citing Legislation Relating to Organized Crime: Hearing on
H.R. 468, H.R. 1246, etc., before Subcommittee No. 5 of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1961); see also United States v. Ferber, 966 F.Supp. 90, 101 (D. Mass.
1997) (quoting United States v. Nardello, 393 U.S. 286, 291 (1969) (quoting S. Rep. No.
644, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961)).
27 United States v. Archer, 486 F.2d 670, 679 (2d Cir. 1973) (citing S.Rep. No.644, at
4 (1961)).
28 Id. (quoting Attorney General’s Program to Crush Organized Crime and
Racketeering: Hearings on S.1653‐1658 before S. Judiciary Comm. 87th Cong. 15-17
(1961) (Statement of Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy)).
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context.29 The Supreme Court defended the Travel Act’s non-traditional,
or off-brand use, in Perrin v. United States.30 The Perrin Court
understood the Travel Act to reflect Congress’s clear and deliberate
intent to alter the federal-state balance in order to enforce the Travel
Act’s underlying predicate state bribery statutes.31 The Supreme Court
did not differentiate between bribery statutes related to organized
crime and more general bribery statutes. Rather, the Court spoke
broadly about Congress’s motivation to enforce violations of state law
within federal statutes.32 As such, the government may utilize the Travel
Act in health care prosecutions.
In United States v. Le Faivre, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit noted that even if it was desirable or wise to limit the
Travel Act to organized crime, the court lacks the authority to make that
determination.33 Courts play a judicial role, and, as such, it is
inappropriate to enter the legislative sphere. Congress has the power to
create and to define the Travel Act’s dictates, and it decided not to limit
the statute to organized crime.34 Beyond that, courts should not prevent
prosecutors from charging Travel Act violations in health care corrupt
payment prosecutions.
2. The Federal Government’s Interest in Pursuing
Private‐Payor Schemes
In 2019, the federal government spent almost 1.2 trillion dollars on
health care.35 In order to protect this enormous government
expenditure, the federal government and its agencies have organized
strike force teams to investigate and prosecute those who manipulate
the system for their own pecuniary benefit.36 Given the amount of
money at stake and the number of health care programs the government

29 See generally Souter, supra note 20 (discussing how the Travel Act had recently
been used in health care abuse and fraud prosecutions).
30 Perrin, 444 U.S. at 50.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 United States v. Le Faivre, 507 F.2d 1288, 1293-94 (4th Cir. 1974).
34 See 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (2014).
35 Tax Policy Center, How Much Does the Federal Government Spend on Health Care?,
https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/how-much-does-federalgovernment-spend-health-care (last visited Mar. 25, 2021) (“Of that, Medicare claimed
roughly $644 billion, Medicaid and the Children’s Health Insurance Pro-gram (CHIP)
about $427 billion, and veterans’ medical care about $80 billion.”).
36 See DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, STRIKE FORCE OPERATIONS (2020),
https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/strike-force-operations (last visited Apr. 5,
2021).
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administers,37 the federal government’s interest is obvious in regards to
government-payor programs. However, some legal commentators have
recognized the aggressive position the Department of Justice is taking in
punishing schemes involving private‐payor items and services.38
Accordingly, this raises issues regarding the appropriateness of the
federal government’s interest in fraudulent private-payor schemes.
i. The Government’s Interest in Corrupt Payments and
Fraud and Abuse Schemes involving Private-Payor
Health Care Programs
Unlike the federal Anti-Kickback Statute (AKS) which only targets
corrupt payments associated with government-payor programs, the
Travel Act does not require a connection between the illegal
remuneration and a federal health care program. Rather, the Travel Act
criminalizes unlawful activities more broadly, such as corrupt
payments.39 The Act punishes those who travel in interstate commerce
or use the mail or facilities in interstate commerce with the intent to
engage in unlawful activity.40
However, the federal government’s interest in recovering money
from illicit health care schemes also extends to the private-payor
context. An argument implying the government should not involve itself
in the private-payor context because it does not pay the bill fails to
recognize the health care system’s important, life-sustaining nature. In
addition, the federal government seeks to punish nefarious health care
providers, as it does with any other criminal actor.41 Prosecutors should
be able to pursue these providers regardless of whether their illegal
activities involve a private-payor or a government-payor because illicit
action and corruption in health care is a major threat to the system as a
whole.42 It should not matter who pays the bill.
Moreover, the Travel Act is neither the first, nor the only example
of the federal government voicing its interest in preventing and
investigating health care fraud and abuse involving private-payors. In
September 2012, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
37

See INST. OF MED., supra note 7, at 3.
See Johnathan N. Halpern & Ilenna J. Stein, Hospitals, Doctors (and Others) Beware:
DOJ May Apply Travel Act to Healthcare Prosecutions, HOLLAND & KNIGHT (Apr. 25, 2019),
https://www.hklaw.com/en/insights/publications/2019/04/hospitals-doctors-andothers-beware-doj-may-apply-travel-act.
39 See 18 U.S.C. § 1952.
40 Id.
41 See generally Dep’t. of Justice, supra note 1.
42 See U.S. DEP’T. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES & DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, HEALTH CARE FRAUD
AND ABUSE CONTROL PROGRAM ANNUAL REPORT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2018 10 (May 2019).
38
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(HHS) Secretary and the U.S. Attorney General signed the Health Care
Fraud Prevention Partnership (HFPP) Charter, which established a data
sharing project between the public sector and private health care
insurance industry.43 The HFPP Charter strives to improve detection
and prevention of health care fraud through a private-public sector data
exchange, and to provide a forum for private and public leaders to share
practices and methods to detect and prevent health care fraud.44 This
coordinated effort highlights the government’s interest in stopping
unlawful activities within private-payor programs and the importance
of pursuing and punishing health care fraud and abuse within the
private health insurance realm.
ii. Increased Federal Resources Expended in Travel Act
Cases
Although the federal government does have an interest in
prosecuting corrupt payment schemes involving private-payor
insurance, is the increased expenditure of federal resources to assist in
state enforcement efforts justified?
In Perrin v. United States, the Court reflected upon the Travel Act’s
history, and recognized Congress’s desire to reference existing state law
in defining the Travel Act. 45 Congress intended to add a second layer of
enforcement because state enforcement officials’ efforts were often
unsuccessful.46 State governments simply lacked the necessary means
to pursue organized crime leaders who lived in one state but carried out
their illicit activities in different states.47
Just as state and local governments needed the Travel Act to target
organized crime with federal resources, the federal government may
supplement the states’ resources to address illegal conduct within the
health care sphere. Section 1952 helps federal agencies, such as the DOJ,
43 About the Partnership, THE HEALTHCARE FRAUD PREVENTION PARTNERSHIP,
https://hfpp.cms.gov/about/background.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2021). Currently,
HFPP’s members include five federal partners, including the U.S. Department of Defense,
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, and U.S. Department of Labor, as well as
ninety-two private insurance carriers. Current Partners, THE HEALTHCARE FRAUD
PREVENTION PARTNERSHIP, https://www.cms.gov/hfpp/about/current-partners (last
visited Mar. 19, 2021).
44 About
the Partnership, HEALTHCARE FRAUD PREVENTION PARTNERSHIP,
https://hfpp.cms.gov/about.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2021).
45 Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 41-42 (1979).
46 Id. at 42.
47 See generally United States v. Archer, 486 F.2d 670, 679 (2nd Cir. 1973) (citing
Attorney General’s Program to Crush Organized Crime and Racketeering: Hearing before
Sen. Judiciary Comm. 87 Cong. 15-17 (1961) (Statement of Attorney General Robert F.
Kennedy)).
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pursue their interests in prioritizing health care fraud and abuse, even
if it is a departure from the government’s ordinary charging theories.
And, the DOJ is not the sole agency interested in prosecuting health care
bribes and kickback schemes—the DOJ also coordinates with state,
federal, private and public partners to ameliorate this issue because
“healthcare fraud affects everyone.”48 In the end, the health care
system’s public importance allows the federal government to employ
vast amounts of resources to ferret out kickbacks in the private-payor
context.49
B. TRAVEL ACT ISSUES IN PRACTICE: CASE STUDIES
Recent developments in New Jersey, Texas, and Florida illustrate
the rise of the Travel Act as a powerful tool in health care prosecutions.
These cases, involving millions of dollars and numerous defendants,
indicate that courts recognize the Travel Act as a viable instrument to
punish individuals engaged in corrupt payment practices in the health
care system.
1. The Biodiagnostic Laboratory Services Scheme
Beginning in March 2006 and lasting until approximately April
2013, Biodiagnostic Laboratory Services (BLS), a New Jersey-based lab,
routinely paid physicians bribes to induce them to refer their blood
samples from Medicare and private-payor beneficiaries to BLS for
testing.50 These actions resulted in convictions of fifty-three defendants,
including thirty-eight doctors, namely Dr. Greenspan and Dr. Ostrager.51
i. United States v. Greenspan
Dr. Greenspan, one of the doctors charged, accepted bribes from
BLS in exchange for referring out his patients’ blood tests to BLS.52 He
was convicted under the Travel Act and the federal Anti-Kickback
48 Denise O. Simpson, Health Care Programs and Fighting Healthcare Fraud in United
States of America, 64 U.S. ATTORNEYS’ BULLETIN 1, 5-6 (2016).
49 Smith, supra note 10 at 2.
50 Indictment at 4, United States v. Greenspan, No. 2:16-cr-00114-WHW (D.N.J. Mar.
8, 2016).
51 Although there are fifty-three defendants convicted in the BLS scheme, this
Comment will focus on defendants Greenspan and Ostrager, as they were indicted and
filed motions challenging the use of the Travel Act. See Press Release, Dep’t. of Justice,
President of New Jersey Clinical Laboratory and His Brother, A Senior Employee,
Sentenced to Provision in $100m+ Test Referral/Bribery Scheme (June 13, 2018),
https://www.justice.gov/usao-nj/pr/president-new-jersey-clinical-laboratory-andhis-brother-senior-employee-sentenced-prison.
52 United States v. Greenspan, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108856, at *45 (D.N.J. Aug. 16,
2016).
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Statute (AKS) for accepting bribes within a long-running BLS scheme.53
Over the course of the scheme, Greenspan received $200,000 in bribes
from BLS “in the form of sham rental checks, service agreement[s], and
consultant payments.”54 Dr. Greenspan was indicted under both the AKS
and the Travel Act due to the scheme involving both government and
private insurance beneficiaries.55 For the referrals of the Medicare
patients’ blood specimens to BLS for testing, Dr. Greenspan was charged
with violations of the federal Anti-Kickback Statute.56 For the portion of
the scheme that involved referring privately insured patients’ blood
samples to BLS, Dr. Greenspan was charged under the Travel Act.57
ii. United States v. Ostrager
Another defendant involved in the BLS scheme was Dr. Bret
Ostrager, a doctor from Nassau County, New York.58 From 2011 to 2013,
Ostrager accepted monthly cash bribes of approximately $3,300 per
month and other valuable items as bribes for referring his Medicare and
privately insured patients to BLS.59 The referrals that Ostrager
generated enabled BLS to collect approximately $909,000 from
Medicare and private insurers.60 Because the illicit payments that
Ostrager received within the BLS scheme involved both governmentpayor beneficiaries and private-payor patients, federal prosecutors
charged Ostrager with violations of both the Anti-Kickback Statute and
the Travel Act.61

53 Press Release, Dep’t. of Justice, Bergen County Doctor Convicted of Taking Bribes
in Test-Referral Scheme with New Jersey Clinical Lab (Mar. 6, 2017),
https://www.justice.gov/usao-nj/pr/bergen-county-doctor-convicted-taking-bribestest-referral-scheme-new-jersey-clinical-lab (announcing that Greenspan was
convicted of one count of conspiring to commit violations of the Anti-Kickback Statute,
the Federal Travel Act and wire fraud, three substantive violations of the Anti-Kickback
Statute, three substantive violations of the federal Travel Act, and three substantive
violations of wire fraud).
54 Dep’t. of Justice, supra note 53.
55 Defendant was also indicted on Honest Services Fraud, which is outside the scope
of this Comment; See Indictment, supra note 50.
56 Indictment, supra note 50, at 16.
57 Id. at 18.
58 Indictment at 4, United States v. Ostrager, No. 2:15-cr-00399-SRC (D.N.J. Aug. 12,
2015).
59 Id. at 4-5, 7.
60 Id. at 5; see also Press Release, Dep’t. of Justice, New York Doctor Sentenced to 37
Months in Prison For Taking Bribes in Test-Referral Scheme with New Jersey Clinical
Lab (June 8, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/usao-nj/pr/new-york-doctor-sentenced37-months-prison-taking-bribes-test-referral-scheme-new-jersey.
61 Indictment, supra note 58, at 11-14.
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2. The Forest Park Medical Center Scheme
The federal government has also prosecuted defendants who opted
out of government-payor programs entirely to avoid punishment. In
2016, federal prosecutors charged twenty-one defendants, including
physicians, advertising executives, health care executives, and one
attorney, with Travel Act violations in the Northern District of Texas
case, United States v. Beauchamp.62 Beauchamp involved a kickback
scheme where Forest Park Medical Center (FPMC), a physician-owned
hospital, paid more than $40 million in bribes and kickbacks to induce
physicians to use the hospital.63 The DOJ asserted that the FPMC
conspiracy consisted of three prongs: (1) maximizing FPMC’s patient’s
insurance reimbursement by refusing to join certain low-reimbursing
insurance plan networks; (2) maximizing patient referrals by paying
kickbacks to physicians; and (3) disguising the scheme as a legitimate
transaction through sham business ventures.64 The scheme centered on
defendants choosing only to treat those with high-reimbursing
commercial insurance plans at FPMC, and transferring lowerreimbursing, mostly government-payor, beneficiaries in exchange for
cash.65 Most of the kickbacks in the FPMC scheme were disguised as
consulting or marketing fees, but were actually corrupt payments
distributed to doctors based on the percentage of surgeries each doctor
referred to FPMC.66 FPMC’s hospital manager, Alan Beauchamp,
testified that FPMC “bought surgeries” from doctors, and then
Beauchamp “papered it up to make it look good.”67 Legal commentators
have suggested that the prosecutors’ use of the Travel Act in the FPMC
case serves as a reminder that health care providers who do not accept

62

Jonathan S. Feld, Monica B. Wilkinson, Lea F. Courington, & Alison L. Carruthers,
The Rise of the Travel Act, L. J. NEWSLETTERS (Oct. 2017).
63 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t. of Justice, Seven Guilty in Forest Park Healthcare Fraud
Trial (Apr. 10, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndtx/pr/seven-guilty-forest-parkhealthcare-fraud-trial; Brett Barnett & Nesko Radovic, DOJ’s Travel Act Prosecution
Yields Convictions for Kickbacks Involving Private Payors, MCGUIRE WOODS LLP (May 28,
2019),
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/doj-s-travel-act-prosecution-yields78519/ (last visited Apr. 5, 2021).
64 David J. Edquist et al., Forest Park Medical Center and the Travel Act: Different
Road, Same Destination, NAT’L L. REV., (Apr. 23, 2019),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/forest-park-medical-center-and-travel-actdifferent-road-same-destination.
65 Feld, supra note 62 (citing Indictment, United States v. Beauchamp, No. 3-16cr0516D (N.D. Tex. Nov. 16, 2016)).
66 U.S. Dep’t. of Justice, supra note 63
67 U.S. Dep’t. of Justice, supra note 63
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Medicare or Medicaid beneficiaries and engage in sham arrangements
to disguise physician referrals are still at risk of federal prosecution.68
In the FPMC scheme, the Travel Act proved useful in prosecuting
parts of the scheme that did not violate the federal Anti-Kickback
Statute; prosecutors were only able to charge violations of the federal
Anti-Kickback Statute against those who “knowingly” received or
solicited illegal renumerations in connection with government-payor
beneficiaries.69 Out of the twenty-one defendants, seven were found
guilty of violating the federal Anti-Kickback Statute, ten pled guilty
before trial, and two of the defendants were found guilty of Travel Act
violations.70 Without the Travel Act, certain actors in this gross abuse of
the health care system – amounting to 40 million dollars in illicit
payments – would have gone unpunished.
3. The Delray Beach Patient Brokering Scheme
In United States v. Snyder, defendant Eric Snyder established a
substance abuse treatment center for individuals suffering from drug
and alcohol addiction.71 In order to bring residents to the center, the
defendant provided kickbacks and bribes in the form of “free or reduced
rent, payment for travel, and other benefits.”72 Defendants further paid
“patient brokers” kickbacks for referring clients to the treatment
center.73 On top of these bribes and kickbacks, Snyder paid doctors to
order expensive urine drug screenings so that private insurance
providers would reimburse Snyder for the tests.74 Unlike the cases
mentioned above, there was no federal-payor program involved in
Synder, so the indictment could not, and did not, contain any federal
Anti-Kickback Statute charges, but did include Travel Act charges.75 As

68

Edqusit et al., supra note 64.
Feld, supra note 62.
70 Healthcare Fraud Update: The Forest Park Medical Center Case and Federal
Enforcement
of
Private
Insurance
Referrals,
SBEMP
ATTORNEYS,
https://sbemp.com/healthcare-fraud-update-the-forest-park-medical-center-caseand-federal-enforcement-of-private-insurance-referrals/ (last visited Apr. 5, 2021).
71 Indictment at 14, United States v. Snyder, No. 18-cr-80111-ROSENBERG (S.D. Fla.
Jun. 7, 2018).
72 Id.
73 Id. at 14; Id. at 20; “Patient brokering” or “body brokering” refers to the
unscrupulous doctors in the opioid and drug treatment business who refer patients to a
facility in return for a generous kickback; See Partnership to End Addiction, What to
Look For — and what to Avoid – When Searching For an Addiction Treatment Program,
https://drugfree.org/article/what-to-look-for-and-what-to-avoid-when-looking-foran-addiction-treatment-program/ (last visited Apr. 5, 2021).
74 Id. at 16-20.
75 Id. at 19.
69
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in the BLS and FPMC schemes, Snyder provides another illustration for
why prosecutors need the Travel Act—to pursue individuals engaged in
illicit remuneration schemes that cannot be charged under traditional
health care corrupt payment statutes.76
C. THE TRAVEL ACT IN THE HEALTH CARE REALM
In light of the Travel Act’s original purpose and legislative history,
some may feel uncomfortable with applying this statute to health care
prosecutions, such as those mentioned in the above case studies. After
all, the Travel Act is aptly named “Interstate and foreign travel or
transportation in aid of racketing and enterprises.”77 But, a statute’s
title is not dispositive nor is it part of the statutory text.78 A title may be
persuasive, but it is not a substitute for the detailed provisions of the
text.79 In fact, the Second and Sixth Circuits have recognized that it
would be “beyond the proper exercise of judicial powers for courts to
confine the Travel Act to its title.”80 If the legislators meant for the
statute to apply strictly to organized crime, drafters should have added
limiting language.
The Travel Act was originally intended to impede the travel of
persons engaged in illegal business or other unlawful activity and target
actors who lived in one state and operated illicit operations elsewhere.
81 As such, the statutory intent is consistent with federal prosecutors’
new method to charge Travel Act violations where health care providers
live and work in one state and engage in illicit activities in another
state.82

76 The Travel Act was an especially necessary prosecutorial tool because Snyder was
charged in June 2018 prior to EKRA’s October 2018 enactment, which addressed
corrupt patient-brokering practices. See Indictment, supra note 71; See 18 U.S.C. §220.
77 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (2014).
78 See, Larry M. Eig, Statutory Interpretation: General Principles and Recent Trends,
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE 1, 35-36 (2014).
79 Id.
80 United States v. Archer, 486 F.2d 670, 680 (2d Cir. 1973) (citing Fraser v. United
States, 145 F.2d 139, 142 (6th Cir. 1944)).
81 Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 811 (1971) (citing S. Rep. No. 644, at 2-3
(1961)).
82 E.g., Def’s Memorandum of Law to Dismiss Charges and Other Relief, United States
v. Ostrager, Crim. No. 15-399 (D.N.J. Sept. 25, 2015) (charging a New York doctor with a
Travel Act violation when he sent his New York patient’s blood panels to a New Jersey
lab).
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1. The Travel Act as the Federal Government’s Gap
Filler
The Travel Act is an important prosecutorial tool that allows the
federal government to reach health care providers who refuse to accept
Medicare and Medicaid patients and benefits in an attempt to
circumvent AKS sanctions.83 The federal government and its agencies
have a keen interest in prosecuting private-payor health care fraud due
to the troubling trend of health care providers not enrolling in Medicare
or Medicaid, and/or referring Medicare or Medicaid patients to other
providers in exchange for cash or other compensation. 84 Unlike the
federal Anti-Kickback Statute, the Travel Act’s breadth allows federal
prosecutors to pursue health care fraud and abuse cases outside the
government-payor system. But, this leaves open the question: is the
Travel Act too broad for health care prosecutions?
From a textual perspective, the Travel Act’s “broadness” is derived
from its definition of “unlawful activity.”85 “Unlawful activity”
encompasses “extortion, bribery, or arson in violation of the laws of the
State in which committed …”86 Such an interpretation allows for state
commercial bribery laws to serve as a predicate for Travel Act
violations, and substantially impacts the health care sphere.87 The
statute’s language is broad on its face, which clearly allows prosecutors
to pursue health care schemes that involve a violation or an intent to
violate a state commercial bribery statute in connection with an
interstate facility.88
The Travel Act’s rise in popularity is credited not only to its breadth
and significance as a powerful prosecutorial tool, but also as a result of
the noticeable gaps in the federal Anti-Kickback Statute. The Travel Act
allows prosecutors to bypass the government-payor requirement and
extends federal jurisdiction over private-payor illegal kickback
schemes. Rather than criticizing this increase in federal power, the rise
of the Travel Act should serve as a reminder to health care providers,
83

E.g., Indictment, United States v. Beauchamp, No. 3-16cr-0516D (N.D. Tex. Nov.
16, 2016) (charging Travel Act violations when defendant refused to accept government
healthcare program beneficiaries).
84 See Smith, supra note 10 at 5; see also Dep’t. of Health and Human Services, Office
of Inspector General, Advisory Opinion No. 13-03 (June 7, 2013) (stating that the OIG
explicitly denounces agreements where healthcare professionals have either refused to
accept or “carved out” federal payor recipients from otherwise “questionable financial
agreements.”).
85 See 18 U.S.C. § 1952(b) (2014).
86 18 U.S.C. § 1952(b)(2).
87 See Barnett, supra note 63.
88 See generally, Indictment, supra note 50, at 6; Indictment, supra note 83, at 33.
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“that patients – not payments – should guide decisions about how and
where doctors administer treatment.”89 In essence, federal prosecutors
regard the Travel Act as an appropriate way to eliminate AKS’s legal
loophole.90 However, the Travel Act is not a font of unlimited power.
Like the AKS, the government does not have a free pass to prosecute any
suspicious health care arrangement involving private health insurance.
2. State Commercial Bribery Statutes as Limits on the
Travel Act in Health Care Prosecutions
As previously stated, § 1952 prohibits travel in interstate
commerce with the intent to commit an “unlawful activity.”91 In the
health care prosecution context, “unlawful activity” is typically defined
under a state commercial bribery statute, but not all states have a
commercial bribery statute.92 Currently, ten states do not have a
commercial bribery statute or a related statute that satisfies § 1952’s
“unlawful activity” element.93 That begs the question—are Travel Act
prosecutions truly fair if the charges depend on whether an individual
is in a state with a commercial bribery statute? And beyond that, does
the fact that each state has substantively different commercial bribery
statutes still lead to potentially unequal prosecutions?
The Texas Commercial Bribery Statute (TCBS) served as the state
law predicate in the Forest Park Medical Center scheme.94 Prosecutors
charged individuals, including Dr. Beauchamp, under the Travel Act
because they used interstate facilities, namely interstate banking
systems and emails, with the intent to violate the TCBS.95 The TCBS
makes it unlawful for a fiduciary, without the consent of the beneficiary,
to “intentionally or knowingly solicit[], accept[], or agree[] to accept any
benefit from another person on agreement or understanding that the
benefit will influence the conduct of the fiduciary in relation to the
affairs of his beneficiary.”96 As such, state commercial bribery statutes,

89

U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, supra note 63.
Smith, supra note 10, at 2.
91 18 U.S.C. § 1952.
92 Smith, supra note 10, at 3.
93 Smith, supra note 10, at 3. The ten states that do not have a state commercial
bribery statute are: Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Maryland, Montana, New Mexico, Oregon,
Tennessee, West Virginia and Wyoming. Interestingly enough, one state, California, has
multiple state commercial bribery statutes.
94 Indictment, supra note 83, at 33-34.
95 Id.
96 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 32.43 (West 2019).
90
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such as TCBS, cabin possible Travel Act violations to those who have a
fiduciary duty to their beneficiaries.97
Similar to Texas, New Jersey also has a commercial bribery statute.
N.J.S.A. § 2C:21-10 states a “person commits a crime if he solicits, accepts
or agrees to accept any benefit as consideration for knowingly violating
or agreeing to violate a duty of fidelity to which he is subject as … a . . .
physician.”98 In U.S. v. Greenspan, the defendant accepted bribes from
Biodiagnostic Laboratory Services (BLS) in exchange for referring out
his patients’ blood tests to BLS.99 By accepting this consideration, Dr.
Greenspan broke his fiduciary duty because New Jersey physician
regulations expressly prohibit physicians from accepting bribes.100
Although Greenspan is a relatively simple application of the Travel
Act, the decision does not address the question of whether a doctor from
one state has a fiduciary duty under another state’s commercial bribery
statute.101 The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey
in Ostrager answered this question in the affirmative, and denied the
defendant-physician’s motion to dismiss a Travel Act violation.102 As
previously mentioned, Ostrager arose out of the larger Biodiagnostic
Laboratory Services (BLS) scheme. In Ostrager, the defendant argued
he did not owe the fiduciary duty required under the New Jersey State
Commercial Bribery Statute because he is a New York doctor with no
New Jersey ties.103 But, the court held that the government’s allegation
of express quid pro quo conduct, i.e. the payment in exchange for sending
the patient to a particular facility, was enough to deny the defendant’s
motion to dismiss.104 The court understood this case to involve a New
York doctor who made the conscious decision to send his patient’s blood
panels to a New Jersey lab, BLS, in return for compensation, and
accepted compensation through a New Jersey-based bank.105 These
actions were enough to meet the “bribery . . . in violation of the laws of
the State in which committed” element under § 1952.106
97

Under § 32.43(a)(2)(C), physicians are named as a fiduciary.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:21-10 (1979).
99 United States v. Greenspan, No. 16-114 (WHW), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108856, at
*48 (D.N.J. Aug. 16, 2016).
100 Id.
101 Id. at *2-3.
102 Transcript of Oral Argument Part B at 14-15, United States v. Ostrager, Crim. No.
15-399 (D.N.J. Sept. 25, 2015).
103 Def’s Memorandum of Law to Dismiss Charges and Other Relief at 4, United States
v. Ostrager, Crim. No. 15-399 (D.N.J. Sept. 25, 2015).
104 Transcript of Oral Argument Part B at 18-19, United States v. Ostrager, Crim. No.
15-399 (D.N.J. Sept. 25, 2015).
105 Id. at 12, 19-20.
106 See 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (2014).
98
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In short, Ostrager broke his fiduciary duty under N.J.S.A. § 2C:2110 when he engaged in self-dealing and used his position and
connections in New Jersey to further his personal interest, rather than
acting in his patients’ best interest.107 The court held Ostrager should
have been on notice that the New Jersey Commercial Bribery Statute
would govern his conduct due to his exchange with a New Jersey lab.108
Ostrager’s self-interested interaction with the lab allowed a
jurisdictional basis for New Jersey district courts and, consequently, the
federal government under § 1952, to impose sanctions on Ostrager.109
The Texas and New Jersey District Courts found the state law
predicate violation and interstate nexus sufficient for the Travel Act, but
United States v. Snyder illustrates what occurs when prosecutors charge
an insufficient state law predicate. In Snyder, the alleged interstate
nexus was the purchase of plane tickets to bring the clients to the
substance abuse treatment center.110 However, the defendant moved to
have the Travel Act count dismissed, arguing the Florida Patient
Brokering Statute (Fla. Stat. § 817.505) was not a proper state law
predicate and did not govern his actions.111 Section 817.505 prohibits
health care facilities from offering kickbacks to induce patient referrals
to a health care facility.112 Snyder argued that the Florida Patient
Brokering Statute was not an appropriate state law predicate for the
Travel Act, as § 1952 does not include “kickbacks” as an “unlawful
activity.”113 Rather, the Travel Act defines “unlawful activity” as
“extortion, bribery, or arson in violation of the laws of the State in which
committed.”114 The defendant criticized the government’s attempt to
expand the Travel Act’s definition of “unlawful activity” to include
“kickbacks,” and sought to stop the government from claiming that
“bribery” and “kickbacks” are synonymous.115
107 Transcript of Oral Argument Part B at 26, United States v. Ostrager, Crim. No. 15399 (D.N.J. Sept. 25, 2015).
108 Id. at 38.
109 Id. at 20.
110 Indictment, supra note 71, at 20.
111 Reply to Gov’t Consolidated Response to Snyder’s Mot. to Dismiss Travel Act
Counts at 1-2, United States v. Snyder, No. 18-cr-80111-ROSENBERG (S.D. Fla. July 1,
2019).
112 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 817.505 (2020).
113 Reply to Gov’t Consolidated Response to Snyder’s Mot. to Dismiss Travel Act
Counts at 2, United States v. Snyder, No. 18-cr-80111-ROSENBERG (S.D. Fla. July 1,
2019).
114 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (2014).
115 Reply to Gov’t Consolidated Response to Snyder’s Mot. to Dismiss Travel Act
Counts at 2, United States v. Snyder, No. 18-cr-80111-ROSENBERG (S.D. Fla. July 1,
2019).
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Snyder illustrates the Travel Act’s limits. Although the case ended
in a plea agreement, the government ultimately dismissed the Travel Act
charge.116 There is a good reason to believe the Travel Act violation
would not have withstood judicial scrutiny because the Florida Patient
Brokering Statute is not a state law governing “unlawful activity.”
Patient brokering kickbacks do not meet the Travel Act’s statutory
definition of “unlawful activity,” even if kickbacks are considered
unlawful in other legal contexts.
In Snyder, the proper state law predicate may have been the Florida
Commercial Bribery Statute. However, the statute did not apply to
Snyder’s situation.117 The Florida Commercial Bribery Statute requires
a “public servant” to be engaged in the alleged misconduct, and Snyder,
as a substance abuse treatment center owner, is clearly not a public
servant.118 Although it is somewhat speculative, the outcome in Snyder
illustrates that the Travel Act is not an infinite source of power in health
care prosecutions. The Travel Act has limits—namely that a proper
state law predicate must be charged.
D. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
Due to the Travel Act’s heavy reliance on state law and the great
deal of overlap with other federal statutes, a proper inquiry into the
questions of federalism, preemption, and double jeopardy must be
evaluated. One prominent lingering question that arises after evaluating
Greenspan, Beauchamp, and Snyder is whether federal prosecutors
should be able to use state laws to confer federal jurisdiction over a
case?
1. Federal Auxiliary Criminal Jurisdiction and
Federalism Concerns
Because the Travel Act’s language includes a state law predicate to
confer federal jurisdiction, there is the unanswered question as to
whether the Travel Act takes federal criminal law beyond its reasonable
bounds and disrupts the delicate federalism balance. Even outside the
116 Plea Agreement at 1, United States v. Snyder, No. 18-cr-80111-ROSENBERG (S.D.
Fla. July 23, 2019).
117 There is the possibility that the federal prosecutors charged Snyder with
violations of the Patient Brokering Statute because the prosecutors may not have had
the same intimate familiarity with state commercial bribery statutes as they do with
federal statutes.
118 Reply to Gov’t Consolidated Response to Snyder’s Mot. to Dismiss Travel Act
Counts at 2, United States v. Snyder, No. 18-cr-80111-ROSENBERG (S.D. Fla. July 1,
2019); Complaint at 2, United States v. Snyder, No. 18-cr-80111-ROSENBERG (S.D. Fla.
July 11, 2017).
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Travel Act context, there is widespread concern that “federal auxiliary
criminal jurisdiction” has become so prevalent that all local offenses
become federal crimes if some distinctive federal involvement or
attribute is present.119 Section 1952’s interstate element, however,
dismisses federalism-based concerns, and makes federal jurisdiction
and the use of federal resources appropriate. After all, the government
is simply using its constitutional power “to prohibit activities of
traditional state and local concern that also have an interstate nexus.”120
In United States v. Goldfarb, the court held “[t]he overriding federal
nature of the Travel Act dictates that an offense thereunder is primarily
federal in nature[,]” and “[t]he gravamen of the offense is the interstate
nexus,” not the state commercial bribery statute.121 Although the
defendant in Goldfarb claimed there was no Travel Act violation because
the state law (absent the Travel Act charge) violated his constitutional
rights, the court rejected this argument because a state law’s
constitutionality does not bear on the Travel Act violation.122 Rather,
the state law serves as a predicate for a Travel Act violation, and “there
is no need to prove a violation of state law as an essential element of
federal crime.”123 Goldfarb gives credence to the proposition that the
Travel Act is a federal offense wholly separate from the underlying state
law predicate, which allows the government to confer federal
jurisdiction and resources.
Similarly, the Northern Texas District Court concluded the Travel
Act does not violate federalism principles because a commercial
bribery statute violation (or intent to violate) coupled with an
interstate nexus is a valid federal concern.124 As such, the court did not
dismiss the defendant’s Travel Act charge and rejected the defendant’s
119

See United States v. Archer, 486 F.2d 670, 678 (2d Cir. 1973) (citing N. Abrams,
Consultant’s Report on Jurisdiction, 1 Working Papers of the National Commission on
Reform of Federal Criminal Laws, 33, 36 (1970)). Abrams’ work discusses the possibility
that the federal government can now involve itself in all types of substantive criminal
prosecution so long as there is some distinctive federal involvement, such as interstate
commerce, travel, or facilities. See N. Abrams Consultant’s Report on Jurisdiction, 1
Working Papers of the National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws 36-37
(1970). His work also proposes the idea that the Travel Act is the logical limit of this
idea. Id.
120 Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979). The validity of Congress’ power
under the Commerce Clause of the Federal Constitution is outside this Comment’s scope.
121 United States v. Goldfarb, 464 F. Supp. 565, 574 (E.D. Mich. 1979).
122 Id.
123 Id. (citing United States v. Prince, 515 F.2d 564, 566 (5th Cir. 1975); United States
v. Nardello 393 U.S. 286, 292 (1959); United States v. Conway, 507 F.2d 1047, 1051 (5th
Cir. 1975)).
124 United States v. Barker, No. 3:16-CR-516-D, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 152475, at *45
(N.D. Tex., Sept. 20, 2017).
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argument that the Travel Act unconstitutionally altered the federalstate balance and ran afoul of federalism principles.125
i. Is the Travel Act’s Interstate Nexus Too Tenuous to
Confer Federal Jurisdiction?
Concerns involving the Travel Act’s interstate nexus are nothing
new. In 1971, the Supreme Court questioned and addressed the
widespread implications of an aggressive use of the Travel Act in Rewis
v. United States.126 The Rewis Court reasoned that § 1952’s legislative
history discusses punishing organized crime syndicates, but the
legislative record is silent beyond that.127 The Court interpreted that
silence as intentional, and concluded that if the Travel Act was to apply
to “criminal activity solely because that activity is at times patronized
by persons from another State,” then Congress would have addressed
that possibility.128 Moreover, the Court reasoned Congress would have
certainly recognized that an expansive Travel Act potentially “could
alter sensitive federal-state relationships, could overextend limited
federal police resources, and might produce situations in which the
geographic origin of customers, a matter of happenstance, would
transform relatively minor state offenses into federal felonies.”129
However, this criticism is not applicable to utilizing the Travel Act
for health care prosecutions. The issue in Rewis centered on defendants
charged with violating the Travel Act because of “a matter of
happenstance.”130 It just so happened that actors who wanted to
participate in the defendant’s illegal Florida lottery traveled over the
nearby Florida-Georgia line.131 In contrast, in health care corrupt
payment cases, the interstate travel or use of interstate facilities is not
“a matter of happenstance,” rather health care professionals make the
conscious decision to use interstate facilities to further their unlawful
actions in violation of state commercial bribery statutes.132
125

Id.
See Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808 (1971).
127 Id. at 811-12.
128 Id. Notably, in United States v. Archer, the court said if the Travel Act’s language
was read literally the act would cover “a $10 payment to fix a traffic ticket if only the
person desiring the fix walked across a state line to pay off the policeman.” United States
v. Archer, 486 F.2d 670, 679 (2d Cir. 1973).
129 Rewis, 401 U.S. at 812.
130 See id.
131 Id. at 810.
132 See generally United States v. Barker, No. 3:16-CR-516-D, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
152475, at *14-15 (N.D. Tex., Sept. 20, 2017).
126
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ii. Interstate Nexus in Greenspan and Beauchamp:
In Greenspan, a New Jersey District Court judge held an indictment
correctly alleged a Travel Act violation and denied defendant’s motion
to dismiss, accordingly.133 The indictment charged defendant-physician
with violating the Travel Act because he traveled in interstate commerce
and used the mail and facilities of interstate commerce in furtherance of
acts of commercial bribery that violated the New Jersey Bribery statute,
N.J.S.A. § 2C:21-10.134 The court denied Greenspan’s motion to dismiss
because he violated the Travel Act when he received compensation via
an interstate bank wire for blood tests after he received a consulting
agreement check, a text message in connection with payment for
defendant’s holiday party, and a text message in connection with the
delivery of a “consulting agreement” payment.135 The defendant’s travel
in interstate commerce with the intent to distribute the proceeds of any
“unlawful activity,” as defined by the New Jersey Commercial Bribery
statute, was enough to charge a Travel Act violation and to withstand
judicial scrutiny on a motion to dismiss.136
Similarly, in Beauchamp, prosecutors correctly utilized the Texas
Commercial Bribery Statute predicate to satisfy § 1952.137 The Texas
Commercial Bribery Statute makes it unlawful for a fiduciary “without
the consent of his beneficiary, [to] intentionally or knowingly solicit[],
accept[], or agree[] to accept any benefit from another person on
agreement or understanding that the benefit will influence the conduct
of the fiduciary in relation to the affairs of his beneficiary.”138 Forest
Park Medical Center allegedly paid money to physicians in exchange for
patient referrals, which violated the Texas Commercial Bribery
Statute.139 And because the bribe was paid through an interstate
banking system, the government could properly allege a Travel Act
133 United States v. Greenspan, No. 16-114 (WHW), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108856, at
*51-52 (D.N.J. Aug. 16, 2016).
134 Id. at *44; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:21-10 (1986) (“A person commits a crime if he
solicits, accepts or agrees to accept any benefit as consideration for knowingly violating
or agreeing to violate a duty of fidelity to which he is subject as … [a] . . . physician”).
135 Greenspan, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108856, at *14, *63.
136 Id. at *42, *44, *51.
137 Indictment, supra note 83, at 32-33; See Press Release, Dep’t. of Justice, 14
Defendants Sentenced to 74+ Years in Forest Park Healthcare Fraud (Mar. 19, 2021),
https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndtx/pr/14-defendants-sentenced-74-years-forestpark-healthcare-fraud.
138 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 32.43(b) (West 2019). Section 32.43(a) lists various
professions, such as physicians, as fiduciaries.
139 See Indictment, supra note 83, at 33-36.
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violation.140 In these corrupt payment Travel Act cases, the interstate
nexus was not too attenuated, as the interstate facilities used in both
Greenspan and Beauchamp were integral to the completion of their
respective schemes.141 Because the use of interstate facilities in these
cases is neither “a matter of happenstance” nor coincidence, the Travel
Act reliance on interstate facilities for the interstate nexus to confer
federal jurisdiction is justified.
2. Preemption Concerns
A Travel Act violation depends heavily on its state commercial
bribery statute predicate. But there may be a conflict between the
federal Anti-Kickback Statute and the state commercial bribery statute,
which may result in the state law being preempted.142 Therefore, if the
state commercial bribery statute is preempted by the AKS, then a Travel
Act violation must be dismissed, as it fails to state the required state law
predicate. AKS can preempt a state commercial bribery statute in three
possible ways: (1) express preemption; (2) field preemption; or (3)
conflict preemption.143 Express preemption occurs when Congress has
pre-empted state authority “by so stating in explicit terms.”144 However,
there is no federal preemption provision in AKS. Therefore, conduct
that is lawful under AKS may still be illegal under state law.145 Field
preemption occurs where the “scheme of federal regulation [is] . . . so
pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no
room for the States to supplement it.”146 The AKS does not preempt
state commercial bribery statutes because each statute regulates
different conduct and people, thus the state and federal statute do not
occupy the same field.147 Nothing in the AKS indicates that Congress
intended to make the statute the sole means of prosecuting health care
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Indictment, supra note 83, at 33-36.
See Indictment, supra note 83, at 33-36; See also United States v. Greenspan, No.
16-114 (WHW), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108856 at 42-51.
142 See United States v. Barker, No. 3:16-CR-516-D, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 152475, at
*9-12 (N.D. Tex., Sept. 20, 2017) (holding the federal law under the AKS does not
preempt the Texas Commercial Bribery Statute).
143 Pac. Gas & Elec. Co v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 416 U.S. 190,
203-04 (1983).
144 Id. at 203.
145 United States v. Barker, No. 3:16-CR-516-D, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 152475, at *10
(N.D. Tex., Sept. 20, 2017).
146 Pac. Gas & Elec. Co v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 416 U.S. 190,
204 (1983).
147 United States v. Barker, No. 3:16-CR-516-D, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 152475, at
*11(N.D. Tex., Sept. 20, 2017).
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fraud.148 In fact, the long history of the AKS peacefully co-existing with
other similar state statutes implies the opposite.149 Finally, there is no
conflict preemption because it is not impossible to comply with both the
state commercial bribery statute and the AKS.150 It is actually quite easy
to comply with both laws—simply do not engage in conduct that is
illegal under the state commercial bribery statute, even if it is legal
under AKS.
3. Double Jeopardy Concerns
When deciding how to charge individuals in corrupt health care
payment cases, prosecutors may use any combination of the Travel Act,
the state commercial bribery statute, and the federal Anti-Kickback
Statute.151 Given the similarities between these three charges, health
care defense attorneys and defendants view the Travel Act as “nothing
more than a veiled attempt by the Government to add volume - but not
substance to its case.”152 Arguably, it is quite possible this prosecutorial
method implicates the “second bite at the apple” theory.153 However, a
closer look at the statutory text resolves these qualms.
One must first recognize that the underlying state commercial
bribery predicate involves different elements than the Travel Act itself.
Under the Travel Act, the prescribed conduct is the “use[] [of] interstate
facilities with the [requisite] intent to . . . promote [some] unlawful
activity.”154 This is separate from the bare commission of acts which
violate state law.155 Section 1952 embodies “a clear Congressional
determination, not to proscribe the underlying state substantive
offense, but rather to prohibit the use of interstate facilities with the
intention of promoting the substantive state offense.”156 As such, the
federal interest exists solely because of the use of interstate facilities,
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Id.
Id.
150 Pac. Gas & Elec. Co v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 416 U.S. 190,
204 (1983).
151 See generally, United States v. Greenspan, No. 16-114 (WHW), 2016 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 108856 at *56-58 (D.N.J. Aug. 16, 2016) (charging all three violations).
152 Id. at *42 (quoting ECF No. 7-12).
153 “Second bite at the apple” is an idiom meaning that one is given a second chance
or opportunity to do the same thing. Critics of the Travel Act argue that it gives
prosecutors a second (or third) chance to try their case, if their initial charges are not
successful. See generally Smith, supra note 10, at 5.
154 McIntosh v. United States, 385 F.2d 274, 275 (8th Cir. 1967).
155 Id. at 275-76.
156 Id. at 278.
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not because the state crime was committed.157 In fact, the Travel Act
does not even require consummation of the state offense, which makes
a § 1952 violation noticeably different than a stand-alone state law
violation.158 Ultimately, the fact that a state can prosecute commercial
bribery does not impinge upon a federal prosecutor’s ability to charge a
Travel Act violation.
As mentioned above, in United States v. Greenspan, Dr. Bernard
Greenspan was indicted for his participation in a bribery and kickback
scheme.159
Since the remuneration scheme involved both a
government-payor and privately-insured patients, Greenspan was
indicted on both the federal Anti-Kickback Statute and Travel Act
charges.160 Defendant argued that these charges were “impermissibly
multiplicitous” and must be dismissed.161 However, the Greenspan
Court was not convinced and recognized defendants can be subjected to
multiple prosecutions for the same conduct if Congress’s intent was to
impose multiple punishments for that conduct.162
In particular, Greenspan addresses the double jeopardy issues
arising from the concern that the Travel Act and the AKS charges are
premised on the same act or transaction.163 The Greenspan Court
recognized this concern and allowed prosecutors to pursue both the
Travel Act and the AKS charges for the same act or transaction so long
as each statute requires a proof of fact that the other does not.164
Prosecutors must be cognizant of an important limit—they “may not
divide up ‘one unit of prosecution’ into pieces and convict a defendant
separately of each piece.”165 The court held that the prosecutors were
157 The federal government’s concern with interstate facilities is entrenched in
Constitution Law principles outside this Comment’s scope.
158 McIntosh, 385 F.2d at 276.
159 United States v. Greenspan, No. 16-114 (WHW), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108856, at
*40-41 (D.N.J. Aug. 16, 2016).
160 See Id. at *13. Defendant was also charged under the Honest Services Fraud
statute, but that is outside the parameters of this Comment and does not change the AKS
and Travel Act analysis.
161 Id. at *56-57.
162 Id. at *57 (citing United States v. Rigas, 605 F.3d 194, 204 (3d Cir. 2010)).
163 Id. at *57-58; The double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment states, “No
person shall . . . be subject to the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.”;
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
164 Id. at *56-58 (quoting Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932)).
165 Id. at *58; A historic example of “dividing up prosecution,” is the 1777 English
Case, Crepps v. Durden. Crepps was a baker who was convicted of four violations of a
statute prohibiting a person “exercising his ordinary calling on a Sunday,” because he
sold four loaves of bread on a Sunday. It was improper that he was charged with four
separate violations for the unitary course of conduct. See United States v. Lacy, 446 F.3d
448, 456 (3d Cir. 2006)(citing Crepps v. Durden, (1777) 98 Eng. Rep. 1283 (K.B.)).
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not punishing Greenspan multiple times for one unit of acts, which
would trigger double jeopardy concerns.166 Rather, the government
accused Greenspan of different individual acts because the bribes
Greenspan was charged with under AKS were different than the bribes
charged under the Travel Act.167
E. THE TRAVEL ACT’S UNANSWERED QUESTIONS
1. Safe Harbor Concerns
The Travel Act, the Anti-Kickback Statute (AKS), and state
commercial bribery statutes regulate similar actions, which gives rise to
the fear that the Travel Act will punish actions that the AKS’s statutory
and regulatory safe harbors protect.168 The AKS’s safe harbor
provisions were promulgated in response to the concern among health
care professionals that many seemingly innocuous and, perhaps
beneficial, commercial arrangements were subject to prosecution under
the AKS.169 Legal commentators, however, worry that the Travel Act
erases the safe harbor’s effectiveness in light of the Travel Act’s
expansive reach.170 Congress initially enacted the AKS to stop “certain
practices which have long been regarded by professional organizations
as unethical … and which contribute[d] appreciably to the cost of
[M]edicare and [M]edicaid programs.”171 However in the 1980s,
Congress recognized that the AKS may be too broad and was chilling
legitimate health care arrangements.172 Because of this worry, Congress
instructed the Department of Health and Human Services to promulgate
safe harbors to exclude certain beneficial payment practices from
possible AKS prosecution.173
As a relatively new prosecutorial tool, health care compliance
attorneys may not immediately realize how the Travel Act and its
underlying state commercial bribery statutes are implicated within the
AKS safe harbor-protected activities. Attorneys who are aware of the
166

Id.
Id. at *58-59.
168 See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(b)(3) (2018); see also 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952 (2016); “Safe
harbors” are needed because the federal Anti-Kickback Statute makes certain beneficial
practices illegal, such as physicians offering discounts to underprivileged and unserved
communities.
169 United States v. Barker, No. 3:16-CR-516-D, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 152475, at *22
(N.D. Tex., Sept. 20, 2017) (quoting 54 Fed. Reg. 3088-01, 3088 (Jan. 23, 1989)).
170 Barnett, supra note 63.
171 H.R. REP. NO. 92-231 at 107 (1971).
172 S. REP. NO. 100-109, at 27 (1987).
173 See 42 U.S.C. §1320a-7d(a).
167
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overlap between health care statutes and the Travel Act fear that their
health care provider clients who comply with the AKS may still
nonetheless violate the Travel Act.174 This is problematic because health
care providers frequently rely on health care attorneys’ advice
regarding the AKS’s safe harbor protections, and they subsequently
engage in protected actions based on this advice.175
Even if a person acts in accordance with a safe harbor provision,
the individual may still violate the Travel Act. In order to violate the
Travel Act, one must intend to promote, manage, carry on, or facilitate
any “unlawful activity.”176 This is a lower mens rea requirement than
the AKS’s “knowing and willful” standard, making it possible to violate
the Travel Act even if one does not violate the AKS or relies on a safe
harbor-protected payment practice. For example, the AKS’s safe harbor
will protect physicians collecting rent for spaces within their practices
if the rental agreement constitutes a bona fide lease under the AKS’s
regulations.177 If an individual accepts the payment, however, with the
intent to facilitate an unlawful activity, such as commercial bribery, that
individual still faces possible criminal prosecution under the Travel Act.
Prosecutors, however, have discretion in bringing Travel Act charges. As
such, it may be unlikely that a prosecutor will bring Travel Act charges
against an individual who has expressed their intent to operate within
the AKS safe harbor. But, there is still a chance that the Travel Act may
defeat the purpose of the AKS if the decision to charge a Travel Act
violation is left solely to prosecutorial discretion.
As with preemption issues discussed above involving the AKS and
the Travel Act’s underlying state commercial bribery predicates, health
care professionals and their attorneys must be aware of all statutes.
There is nothing in the AKS or its regulations that suggest the AKS is the
sole and exclusive means of prosecuting corrupt health care payment
practices.178 Although safe harbors protect individuals from liability
under the AKS, the safe harbors are not a blanket permission to violate
other laws, including the Travel Act.179 Attorneys often work within the
framework of multiple statutes applying to their clients’ professional
ventures, so why should the Travel Act be any different?
174

See Smith, supra note 10; Feld, supra note 62.
See generally, Smyer & Falzarano, supra note 38.
176 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (2014).
177 See 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952 (2016).
178 See United States v. Barker, No. 3:16-CR-516-D, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 152475, at
*30 (N.D. Tex., Sept. 20, 2017.
179 See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(3) (2018) (enumerating safe harbors to the AKS
provisions); 42 C.F.R. 1001.952 (asserting that the following safe harbor-protected
payment practices should not be treated as criminal offenses under the AKS).
175
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2. The Fiduciary Problem
Despite the fact that the Travel Act can function as a gap-filler, the
statute has not fully addressed all possible corrupt payment schemes.
Because the Travel Act relies on state commercial bribery statutes,
Travel Act violations typically require a breach of a fiduciary duty or
“duty of fidelity.”180 Many doctors may fall under the Travel Act if they
agree to accept bribes and kickbacks due to the fiduciary duty they owe
to their patients under state statutes.181 It is difficult, however, to prove
that certain health care administrators, consultants, and other actors in
the greater health care system owe a fiduciary duty.182 As such, the
Travel Act cannot reach those who do not owe a fiduciary duty but
choose to engage in corrupt remuneration schemes involving privatepayor insurance. Ultimately, this makes the Travel Act narrower than
the traditional federal Anti-Kickback Statute, which prohibits anyone,
not just a physician with a fiduciary duty, from participating in illicit
kickback schemes.183

IV.

Conclusion

This Comment has explored the various implications of the federal
government’s relatively new and aggressive method of prosecuting
health care enforcement actions under the Travel Act. After rigorous
scrutiny, many fears surrounding the Travel Act are unwarranted. The
Travel Act does not give prosecutors unlimited power to pursue all
prosecutions, including those involving legitimate and proper health
care arrangements. Rather, § 1952 extends traditional and well-known
prosecutorial methods into the private-payor realm.
Again, § 1952 violations are not just “a veiled attempt by the
government to add volume-but not substance to its case.”184 The federal
government and its agencies have a real interest in pursuing privatepayor schemes because Travel Act violations involve interstate facilities
and important health care systems. Although health care attorneys may
fear this seemingly new prosecutorial method, the solution is education.
180 See e.g. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:21-10 (West 1986) (requiring fiduciary duty); TEX.
PENAL CODE ANN. § 32.43 (West) (requiring fiduciary duty).
181 See United States v. Greenspan, No. 2:16-cr-00114-WHW, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
108856, at *55-56 (D.N.J. Aug. 16, 2016).
182 See e.g. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:21-10 (West 1986) (listing agents, trustees, guardians,
physicians, lawyers, accountants, directors, and officers as individuals who owe a duty
of fidelity).
183 See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b.
184 Greenspan, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108856, at *42 (quoting ECF No. 7-12 at 29).
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It is extremely important for attorneys to analyze and research the
Travel Act’s statutory language, along with applicable state commercial
bribery laws, to best assist their clients in creating compliant health care
practices. Further legal research and education for attorneys in the
health care space is especially warranted because the U.S. Attorney
General’s office has reaffirmed its interest in pursuing health care fraud
and abuse prosecutions under many different federal statutes.185
Because the federal government can now aggressively pursue corrupt
payment schemes involving both government-payor and private-payor
insurance, a comprehensive understanding of the Travel Act will be
consequential moving forward.

185

Feld, supra note 62.

